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Over the past decade, the health of the banking sector in Taipei,China 
has been in decline.  Falling returns on assets and equity, steadily 
rising non-performing loans and bank runs at smaller financial 
institutions have highlighted problems across the banking sector 
as a whole.  
This study analyzes both the causes of, and policy responses to, 
the banking sector problems in Taipei,China, drawing comparisons 
from the experience of Japan.  The author shows that there are 
many valuable lessons to be learned from the Japanese 
experience.  In particular, policy makers in Taipei,China are urged 
to heed the early warning signs of overall banking sector problems 
and to avoid the policy of forbearance.  Importantly, a hoped-for 
macroeconomic recovery cannot be relied upon to help banks 
“grow out” of their problems.  
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PREFACE 
 
  
 The ADB Institute aims to explore the most appropriate development paradigms for Asia 
composed of well-balanced combinations of the roles of markets, institutions, and governments in 
the post-crisis period. 
 
 Under this broad research project on development paradigms, the ADB Institute 
Research Paper Series will contribute to disseminating works-in-progress as a building block of the 
project and will invite comments and questions. 
 
 I trust that this series will provoke constructive discussions among policymakers as well 
as researchers about where Asian economies should go from the last crisis and recovery. 
 
 
 
Masaru Yoshitomi 
Dean  
ADB Institute 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The economy of Taipei,China was able to escape the contagion of the Asian financial 
crisis and remains well insulated from the type of external shocks that forced other economies in the 
region into currency devaluations and deep recession in 1997.  Since that time however, internal 
pressures have gradually weakened many of Taipeis banks and now threaten the stability of the 
banking sector as a whole.  The domestic nature of these pressures have led to comparisons with the 
experience of Japan in the 1990s.    
 
Early warning signs of the banking sector problems in Taipei,China have been evident 
since the mid-1990s in the form of falling ROA and ROE ratios, steadily rising non-performing loans 
and bank runs at several small financial institutions.  More recently, the takeover of two 
medium-sized banks by the financial reconstruction fund has brought to light the fact that the 
problems have spread beyond the small credit cooperatives and credit departments of farmers and 
fishermens associations.  The experiences of Taipei,China thus far closely resemble the early stages 
of Japans banking sector problems.  Since 1990, Japans banking sector has also demonstrated 
declining ROE and ROA ratios.  Non-performing loans have been an issue since the early 1990s as 
well, and as in Taipei,China, non-performing loan ratios have always been particularly acute in 
Japans smaller financial institutions.  In fact, several credit cooperatives and shinkin banks were 
closed in the 1990s.  Often, these failures were resolved via the convoy system under which weak 
financial institutions are taken over by larger, stronger banks, a practice which has been adopted by 
authorities in Taipei,China as well.  In Japan, the banking sector problems finally erupted into a 
full-blown banking crisis in 1997, with the collapse of three of the top 20 banks that had previously 
been considered too big to fail. 
 
There are similarities in not only the symptoms, but also the causes of the banking sector 
problems in Taipei,China and Japan.  In both cases, macroeconomic shocks, in particular the asset 
bubbles in equity and real estate prices, played a significant role in weakening the banking sector.  
But the crucial factor in both cases was the combination of these macroeconomic shocks with 
financial deregulation, which led to disintermediation and overbanking in the financial sector.   
 
As documented here, policy makers in both Taipei,China and Japan, have taken steps to 
address the weakness of the banking system in each economy.  While acknowledging the aggressive 
response of policy makers in Taipei,China, this study points out that there are many 
lessonspositive and negativeto be learned from the experience of Japan.  In particular, policy 
makers in Taipei,China are urged to heed the early warning signs of overall banking sector problems 
and to avoid the policy of forbearance.  Macroeconomic recovery cannot be relied upon to help 
banks grow out of their problems.   
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Taipei,Chinas Banking Problems:  
Lessons from the Japanese Experience   
 
Heather Montgomery 
1. Introduction 
The economy of Taipei,China weathered the Asian financial crisis of 1997 
remarkably well.  While many other Asian economies slipped into recession in 1998, 
Taipei,China maintained a moderate growth rate of 4.83%1 (Ding and Yeh 2001).  The 
current account balance remained positive and the central bank maintained ample foreign 
reserves.  Although the NT dollar has lost some strength since 1999, the currency faced 
nothing like the devaluations experienced in crisis-hit Asian countries.  Neither financial 
institutions nor firms in Taipei,China face the maturity and currency double mismatch 
that pushed much of the rest of Asia into a capital account crisis in the late 1990s (see 
Yoshitomi and Ohno (1999) and Yoshitomi and Shirai (2000)).   
However, while the economy of Taipei,China remains well insulated from the 
type of external shocks that caused the Asian crisis of 1997, the economy is currently 
facing an internal crisis in its banking system.  The non-performing loan ratio of banks in 
Taipei,China have reached an all-time high and measures of bank performance such as 
return on equity and return on assets have been declining steadily since 1997. 
The domestic nature of the problems faced by Taipei,Chinas banking sector has 
led to comparisons with Japans banking crisis of 1997 (Cavey 2002).  This study closely 
examines the banking problems in Taipei,China and the banking crisis in Japan that has 
been so costly, not only to the banking sector, but to the economy as a whole.  Section 2 
reviews events in both countries and presents some statistics on the condition of the 
banking sector.  Section 3 analyzes the causes of the banking sector problems and section 
4 discusses the policies that have been made in response.  Section 5 reviews the 
similarities and differences in the experience of Japan and Taipei,China.  And section 6 
concludes with some policy recommendations for Taipei,China in light of the similarities. 
2. Early Warning Signs 
2.1. Taipei,China 
What are the symptoms of Taipei,Chinas banking sector problems?  The return 
on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) of the major banks in Taipei,China have been 
declining since 1997 (see figure 1).  In addition, the non-performing loan ratio of the major 
banks in Taipei,China has been steadily increasing over the past decade and is now at an 
all-time high.  The most current figure of 7.79% reported in figure 1 is underestimated by 
global standards.2 
                                                 
1 In the 5 years prior to the 1997 crisis, Taipei,China had an average growth rate of 6.3% (ADB 1998). 
2 The biggest difference is the definition of past-due loans.  Under global standards, this would include any 
loans past due by more than 90 days.  The definition currently in use in Taipei,China is any loan past due by 
more than 6 months. 
 2 
Figure 1. Taipei,China: Performance of Major Banks 1991-2001 
 
 
 
The non-performing loan problem, although serious for all banks in 
Taipei,China, is much more pronounced at smaller financial institutions such as the credit 
cooperatives and credit departments of farmers and fishermens associations (see figure 
2). 
Even before the non-performing loan problem had grown to such proportions, 
there were a string of arranged mergers between troubled credit cooperatives and 
healthier banks in the late 1990s (see figure 3 from Lee (2001)).  When the problems in 
the banking sector began to surface after 1997, there were also runs on several financial 
institutions (see figure 4 from Lee (2001)).  These were also resolved, in many cases, via 
arranged mergers with healthier institutions.   
 
 
Figure 2. Taipei,China: Non-Performing Loans of Financial Institutions 1993-2001 
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Figure 3. Taipei,China: List of Arranged Mergers 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Taipei,China: List of Bank Runs 
 
 
 
As the banking sector problems grew, the government finally allocated a special 
Financial Reconstruction Fund to deal with troubled institutions and this was first 
activated in August of last year when 36 institutions, mostly agricultural cooperatives, 
were placed under state management.  Although some public funds were used in this 
process, eventually the troubled financial institutions were again pushed off on to 
healthier banks.  In October 2001, this fund took over the management of Chung Shing 
Bank, a mid-sized bank.  In January of this year, the reconstruction fund took over the 
Medium Business Bank of Kaosiung, another mid-sized bank.  The government has still 
failed to come to an agreement with bidders in order to sell off the bank to a merger 
partner. 
2.2. Japan 
The experience of Taipei,China thus far closely resembles the early stages of 
Japans banking crisis.  Measures of performance such as ROA and ROE are currently 
much higher for banks in Taipei,China than for banks in Japan, where ROA and ROE 
have been negative since 1995.  But the shift in these measures of performance for banks 
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in Taipei,China in 1997 mirrors the shift that occurred in Japan in 1990.  Figure 5, from 
Hoshi and Kashyap (1999), shows long-term trends in the ROE and ROA of Japanese 
banks.  There is a clear shift in 1990, when the trend went from increasing measures of 
performance to steadily declining ROE and ROA ratios. 
 
 
Figure 5. Japan: Performance of Major Banks 1980-1997 
 
 
 
Of course, a major factor in the negative returns of Japanese banks is the massive 
amount of profits the banks have been setting aside as loan loss provisions or to cover 
direct loan write offs.3  It is not coincidental that in the same year that major Japanese 
banks first reported negative ROE and ROA ratios, 1995, the banks dramatically 
increased the amount of funds used in direct loan write offs and provisions (see figure 6).  
Banks in Taipei,China have only just begun to tackle their non-performing loan problem, 
and we may expect to see quickly declining returns as they do so.  If banks in 
Taipei,China follow the same path as Japanese banks, they will be reporting negative 
ROE and ROA in the next fiscal year.   
 
 
                                                 
3 Measures of performance using pre-provision operating profits, gyomu-juneki ratios, are much higher 
and remain positive. 
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Figure 6. Japan: Loss on Disposal of Bad Loans of All Japanese Banks 
(Units: billion yen) FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 Sep 
Loss on Disposal of Bad 
Loans 1,640 3,872 5,232 
13,369 
(11,067) 
7,763 
(6,210) 
13,258 
(10,819) 
13,631 
(10,440) 
6,944 
(5,398) 
6,108 
(4,290) 
2,955 
(2,046) 
Net Transfer to 
Allowance for Loan 
Losses 
945 1,146 1,402 7,087 (5,576) 
3,447 
(2,534) 
8,403 
(6,552) 
8,118 
(5,490) 
2,531 
(1,339) 
2,732 
(1,371) 
1,491 
(875) 
Direct Write-offs 424 2,090 2,809 5,980 (5,490) 
4,316 
(3,676) 
3,993 
(3,501) 
4,709 
(4,268) 
3,865 
(3,609) 
3,072 
(2,650) 
1,322 
(1,059) 
Write-offs of 
Loans 204 235 706 
1,721 
(1,568) 
973 
(850) 
851 
(791) 
2,377 
(2,255) 
1,881 
(1,734) 
2,520 
(2,201) 
1,199 
(958) 
Loss on sales to 
the CCPC 219 1,855 2,103 
2,526 
(2,132) 
1,133 
(971) 
1,043 
(921) 
359 
(339) 
278 
(272) 
163 
(156) 
57 
(53) 
 
 
Loss on sales 
through bulk 
sales etc. 
0 0 0 1,733 (1,791) 
2,210 
(1,855) 
2,099 
(1,789) 
1,973 
(1,674) 
1,706 
(1,604) 
389 
(293) 
67 
(49) 
 
The Others 271 636 1,022 302 (1) 
0 
(0) 
863 
(766) 
804 
(683) 
548 
(449) 
304 
(269) 
142 
(111) 
Aggregate Loss on Disposal 
of Bad Loans from FY 1992 1,640 5,512 10,744 
24,113 
(21,811) 
31,877 
(28,021) 
45,135 
(38,840) 
58,766 
(49,280) 
65,710 
(54,678) 
72,818 
(58,967) 
74,773 
(61,013) 
(Note) 
1. For FY 1992 to FY 1994, above data are composed of City Banks, Long-term Credit Banks and Trust Banks. Figures in ( ) refer to the amount 
of City Banks. Long-term Credit Banks and Trust Banks. 
2. Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank, Tokuyo City Bank, Kyoto Kyoei Bank, Naniwa Bank, Fukutoku Bank and Midori Bank are excluded from FY 
1997 onward. Kokumin Bank, Kofuku Bank and Tokyo Sowa Bank are excluded from FY 1998 onward. Namihaya Bank, and Niigata Chuo 
Bank are excluded from FY 1999 onward. Ishikawa Bank is excluded from FY 2001 Sept. Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (Shinsei Bank at 
present) is excluded from FY 1998. Nippon Credit Bank (Aozora bank at present) is excluded from FY 1998 and FY 1999. 
3. Net Transfer to Allowance for Loan Losses refer to the total amount of Net Transfer to Specific Allowance for Loan Loss and Net Transfer to 
General Allowance for Loan Loss, etc. 
4. Loss on sales through Bulk Sales etc. refer to the total amount of Loss on Sales through Bulk Sales, Loss on Supports to subsidiary etc. 
5. The Others in Loss on Disposal of Bad Loans refer to the total amount of Allowance for expected losses brought by the Loans Sold to CCPC. 
Allowance for expected Losses brought by the Supports to Subsidiary etc. 
 
 
 
One difference between the two countries is that if we use a comparable 
definitions of non-performing loans,4 the non-performing loan ratio of Japans banks has 
remained fairly stable since the problem first surfaced and non-performing loan data 
began to be reported in 1992.  Figure 7 shows that under the narrowest definition, the 
same definition currently in use in Taipei,China (loans to bankrupt borrowers plus past 
due loans), the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans for Japans major banks has 
remained between 3-5% since fiscal year 1992 when non-performing loans were first 
reported in Japan.   
 
 
                                                 
4 In order to be comparable with the definition of non-performing loans used in Taipei,China for most of the 
decade, we use the now outdated definition of non-performing loans for Japan as well: loans to bankrupt 
borrowers and loans which are past due by 6 months or more.  This figure excludes a large category of loans 
that are overdue by 3-6 months. 
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Figure 7. Japan: NPL/Loans* 
 
* NPL=Loans to bankrupt borrowers and past due loans 
 
 
As in Taipei,China, banks in Japan were able to hide the true extent of their 
non-performing loan problem for several years before standard definitions of 
non-performing loans were introduced.  Figure 8 shows the ratio of non-performing loans 
to total loans using the global standard definition of non-performing loans (loans to 
bankrupt borrowers, past due loans and loans past due by more than 3 months) that was 
introduced for most banks in fiscal year 1997.  In addition, as in Taipei,China, the 
non-performing loan problem in Japan is much worse in the smallest financial institutions 
such as the shinkin banks and the credit cooperatives.   
 
 
Figure 8. Japan: NPL/Loans* 
 
* NPL=Global standard definition, including loans past due by more than 3 months 
 
 
Non-performing loan reporting requirements for the credit cooperatives were 
not introduced until fiscal year 1997 in Japan, but even before then, early warning signs 
of a systemic problem appeared as several small credit cooperatives and shinkin banks 
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failed between 1992 to 1997 (see figure 9).  As was the case in Taipei,China, in most 
cases mergers were arranged between the troubled cooperatives and healthier banks.  
However, for some of the larger failures the deposit insurance corporation established 
new banksTokyo-Kyodo Bank and Midori Bank are examplesto take over the failed 
institutions. 
 
 
Figure 9. Japan: List of Failed Credit Cooperatives and Shinkins 
 
 
 
The next warning sign in Japan came when the jusen home mortgage companies 
failed.  In December 1995 the government announced a controversial resolution scheme 
under which agricultural cooperatives, which had provided 40% of the loans to the failed 
jusen, were asked to write off 10% of their loans.  To recover the shortfall of funds, other 
financial institutions (including the founding banks, which were asked to provide 100% 
loan forgiveness) wrote off a substantial amount of loans and 680 billion yen of public 
funds were used (see Yoshitomi and Nagata (1997) for details). 
In 1997 the weakness in Japans financial sector developed into a full-blown 
banking crisis. The first to fall was Sanyo Securities, a mid-sized securities company that 
folded on November 3, 1997.  The next failure was even larger. Hokkaido Takushoku 
Bank failed on November 17, 1997,5 costing the DIC 3,411.3 billion yen, more than the 
2,514 billion yen that had been used in all the DICs previous history.  One week later, on 
November 24, 1997, Yamaichi Securities, one of Japans oldest and largest brokerage 
firms, followed suit. Only two days later, Tokuyo City Bank, a small regional bank, 
collapsed on November 26, 1997.  The following year, two other top 20 banks were 
nationalized. The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan was placed under state stewardship 
on October 23, 1998 and Nippon Credit Bank followed on December 13 of the same year.   
Many of these institutions had previously been considered too big to close. 
The three banks were ranked among the nations top 20 banks, which dominated the 
lending markets, and Yamaichi was one of the top 4 securities houses, which had 
                                                 
5 Actual grant and asset purchase by the DIC took place in October of 1998. 
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previously accounted for over 70% of the securities business. These failures marked the 
end of the traditional convoy system safety net. The news led to a sell off of bank shares 
on the stock market and the emergence of the so-called Japan Premium in overseas 
lending markets. 
3. Causes of the Banking Sector Problems 
This section explores two common factors that triggered the banking sector 
problems in Japan and Taipei,China.  First, both economies experienced extraordinary 
rises in asset markets, followed by dramatic declines.  Second, the financial sector in both 
Japan and Taipei,China experienced rapid financial liberalization, resulting in what has 
been called overbanking.   
3.1. Asset Bubbles 
Asset prices skyrocketed in both Japan and in Taipei,China in the late 1980s.6  In 
Taipei,China, housing prices more than quadrupled between 1987 and 19907 (see figure 
10).  During the same period, the TAIEX soared from 637 points in July 1985 to 12,054 
points in January 1990.  After peaking in January 1990, the TAIEX began to fall, and hit 
as low as 2,705 in September 1990.  Since this initial fall, the market has been extremely 
volatile, rising and crashing again in 1997 and again 2000 (see figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 10. Taipei,China: Housing Price Index 1982-2000 
 
                                                 
6 Yin (2001) provides a description of how financial regulation and macroeconomic policies contributed to 
the asset bubble in Taipei,China. 
7 Real estate prices in Taipei,China have not collapsed as yet (c.f. Japan), partially due to government 
intervention in the market.  However, the effectiveness of these so-called hot air policies is declining and 
real estate prices in certain areas have seen significant drops.  For example, the real estate prices in south 
and central Taipei,China are now 50-60% of their peak (Yin (2001)). 
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Figure 11. Taipei,China: Taiwan Stock Exchange 1980-2000 
 
 
 
In Japan, fluctuations in land and equity prices were less volatile, but the market 
collapse was more decisive.  Commercial land prices doubled between the first half of 
1980 and late 1991 when they peaked (figure 12).  Since 1991, commercial land prices 
have fallen continuously and thus far have lost approximately 60% of their peak value.  
The rise in the stock market was even more impressive.  Rising from 6,768 points in 
January of 1980, the Nikkei 225 index rose almost 500 % to peak at 38,915 at the end of 
1989.  In January of 1990 the Nikkei began to fall, and by September had lost almost half 
its peak value. After recovering slightly, it began another descent in early 1991 and by 
July 1992 had fallen another 25% (figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 12. Japan: Commercial Land Prices 1980-2000 
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Figure 13. Japan: NIKKEI 225 Stock Average 1980-2000 
 
 
3.1.1. Asset Bubbles and the Banking Sector 
The decline in equity and real estate prices greatly affected the banking sector in 
both Japan and Taipei,China.  In Japan, new bank loans in the 1980s8 were 
disproportionately concentrated in three sectors: construction, real estate and the 
non-bank financial sector9 (see figure 14). Thus, bank loan portfolios shifted substantially 
in the 1980s. At the start of the decade manufacturing firms had constituted almost 1/3 of 
outstanding bank loans.  That share had dropped to less than 20% by 1990. Lending to the 
construction, real estate and non-bank financial services sectors had meanwhile grown to 
fill the gap and by the early 1990s the share of those three sectors in total lending was 
equal to that of the manufacturing sector (see figure 15). Most loans to Japans 
construction, real estate and non-bank financial sector went directly or indirectly toward 
property deals. Therefore, the collapse in land prices threatened the viability of the banks 
main borrowers. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Note that the rise in lending began even before the Plaza Accord of 1985. 
9 Finance and insurance. 
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Figure 14. Japan: Growth Rate of Loans Outstanding by Sector 1980-2000 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Japan: Outstanding Loans-Share by Sector 1980 & 1990 
 
 
 
In Taipei,China, a parallel phenomenon was occurring.  As the housing market 
boomed in the 1980s, bank loans to individuals drew double digit loan growth rates 
(figure 16).  In March 1980 20% of total bank lending was to individuals.10 By March 
                                                 
10 Lending to individuals is not entirely housing loans.  The category includes real estate, movable 
properties, business investments and current operations. However, most loan to individuals (64.45%) are 
made to finance real estate.  (Data from CEIC) 
16 18 
31 
Manufacturing 
27 
Wholesale, Retail, 
Eating & Drinking 
        All Sectors         Construction, Real Estate & Non-Banks         Construction and Real Estate 
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1990, the share of lending going to individuals had more than doubled11 (figure 17).  As a 
result, loans to individuals make up a large share44%of the non-performing loans 
held by banks12 (figure 18). 
 
 
Figure 16. Taipei,China: Growth Rate of Loans Outstanding 1980-2001 
 
 
Figure 17. Taipei,China: Outstanding Loans-Share by Sector 1980 & 1990 
 
                                                 
11 Overall, including loans to individuals and various industrial sectors, 36.2% of loans are made to finance 
real estate deals.  Since real estate loans to individuals make up 25.4%, the remaining 10.79% are lending to 
private or government enterprises in order to finance real estate. 
12 Other sectors that stand out relative to the share they hold in the overall loan portfolio are construction, 
commerce and the finance, insurance and real estate sector.  Thus, within loans to private enterprises, the 
composition of non-performing loans by sector is similar to that of Japanese banks. 
2010 
Individual 
4084 
        ALL             Individuals 
Private Enterprises (41.08) 
Private Enterprises (54.35) 
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Figure 18. Taipei,China: Composition of NPL by Sector 2001 
 
 
 
Even loans other than housing loans are often backed by real estate collateral in 
Japan and in Taipei,China.  Thus, the decline in land prices significantly eroded the value 
of the collateral backing these loans. Collateral based lending has historically been used 
by banks in both markets as insurance against incomplete monitoring. In Japan, as banks 
turned increasingly to new, unknown lenders in the 1980s, it seemed prudent to back up 
loans with collateral. These lending conditions appeared favorable to the banks as land 
prices soared in the late 1980s, but when many of these companies were forced to default 
on their loans in the 1990s, the collateral held little value. 
The collapse in the equity markets also hurt the banking sector in both countries.  
Although banks in both Japan and Taipei,China are prohibited from holding more than 
5% of the outstanding shares of any one company,13 in Japan there are no restrictions on 
the total amount of stocks banks may own. When Japans stock market collapsed in 1990, 
almost half of the total number of corporate shares outstanding were held by financial 
institutions.  Currently, banks in both Japan and in Taipei,China hold about 10% of their 
total assets as non-government securities (see figures 19 and 20).  Even in Taipei,China, 
where the total amount of stock banks and insurance companies may hold in public 
companies is limited, the fall in the stock market hurt the banks directly by reducing the 
value of equities held in the banks trading, or short-term investment account. 
 
 
                                                 
13 This law is very difficult to enforce in Taipei,China, due to the family ownership structure. 
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Figure 19. Japan: Composition of Balance Sheet by Bank Type* 
 
*As of September 2000 
 
 
Figure 20. Taipei,China: Composition of Balance Sheet by Bank Type* 
 
*As of September 2000 
 
 
The fall in equity prices also hurt the banks capital stock.  Although equities 
held in the investment or long-term account are not valued at market value,14 banks in 
both Japan and in Taipei,China are allowed to count up to 45% of the unrealized gains on 
these stocks, the difference between the book value and market value, as Tier II capital. 
Thus, the fall in equity prices reduced the banks capital to asset ratios, contributing to a 
capital crunch which reduced aggregate lending. 
There is one additional way in which the equity markets affect the health of the 
banking sector in Taipei,China.  In Taipei,China, so-called leveraged stock purchases 
are common, meaning that companies use bank loans to speculate in stocks.  Thus the 
level of the equity market is directly related to the asset quality of the banking sector even 
for loans that are not going directly to finance property deals.   
                                                 
14 In Japan market value accounting will be used in valuing all securities, in the trading account and 
investment account, as of fiscal year 2001. 
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3.2. Financial Liberalization 
Even before being hit by the additional burden of macroeconomic events, such 
as the asset bubble in equity and land prices, banks in both Japan and Taipei,China were 
forced to adjust to a rapidly changing environment as a result of financial liberalization in 
the 1980s.   
In Japan, the soaring stock market, combined with deregulation of the Japanese 
bond market,15 and the establishment of a commercial paper market in 1987 provided 
Japanese firms, or at least large listed firms, viable, and in many cases less expensive, 
alternatives to bank financing. The banks traditional clients, large manufacturing firms, 
began to turn to these new sources of funding. Figure 21 shows the shift in financing by 
Japanese firms. Large firms decreased their reliance on bank loans (borrowings) for 
funding, while small firms increased their percentage of bank loan financing from about a 
third of total liabilities to over half. Meanwhile, the percentage of bonds in total liabilities 
for large firms more than doubled in the 1980s, while the percentage of bond financing 
for small and medium firms remained flat at less than 1%. 
 
 
Figure 21. Japan: Borrowings/Total Liabilities by Firm Size 1980-2000 
 
                                                 
15 Until the mid-1970s, firms seeking to issue bonds had to secure approval from a body known as the Bond 
Issuance Committee (BIC), which determined who would be allowed to issue bonds and how much each 
issuer could raise. In 1980, international capital flows in and out of Japan were freed with reform of the 
Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Act and many large firms began to list abroad. Restrictions on access 
to the domestic corporate bond market were gradually removed and by the late 1980s firms could avoid the 
bond issuance criteria if they were rated (Hoshi and Kashyap (1999)). According to Hoshi (2000), by 1990 
when all accounting criteria for bond issuance were removed, the number of firms permitted to issue 
unsecured domestic bonds had grown from 2 to over 500. 
        Large Firms       Medium Firms       Small Firms 
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Financial liberalization in Taipei,China came later, beginning with a revision of 
the securities transaction law in 1988 permitting new entrants into the brokerage business.  
The number of brokerage houses and trading accounts expanded and since that time the 
number of companies listed on the TSE has increased from 163 to almost 600.  In 
addition, in July 1994 an over-the-counter stock exchange (OTC) was established.  The 
number of companies listed on the OTC has more than doubled in just 4 years (figure 22).  
Corporate bond financing also grew in importance in the mid-1990s.  The number of 
outstanding corporate bond issues took off (figure 23) and by 1997, corporate bonds 
constituted 32% of long-term debts, up from 5% in 1991 (Ding and Yeh 2001). 
 
 
Figure 22. Taipei,China: Number of Companies Listed on the TSE and OTC 
1980-2001 
 
 
Figure 23. Taipei,China: Outstanding Corporate Bond Issues 1980-2001 
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As a result of this liberalization, throughout the 1990s private enterprises in 
Taipei,China followed the route of large Japanese firms in the 1980s: reducing their 
reliance on indirect financing from banks.  Figure 24 shows the ratio of short-term 
borrowing to total liabilities for about 350 manufacturing firms in Taipei,China between 
1980-2000.  Similar to the pattern we saw for Japan in the 1980s, these manufacturing 
firms have reduced their reliance on indirect financing continuously since 1990. 
 
 
Figure 24. Taipei,China: Borrowing/Total Liabilities Manufacturing Firms 
1980-2000 
 
3.2.1. Taipei,Chinas Banking Law of 1989 
Perhaps even more significant for the banking sector of Taipei,China was the 
deregulation of the industry itself in 1992.  A revision to the Banking Law in 1989 
privatized the banking sector and in June of 1991 15 new banks were permitted to begin 
operations, almost doubling the number of banks in Taipei,China.16 
Financial institutions in Taipei,China include commercial banks,17 medium 
business banks18 and cooperative financial institutions.19  Following Lee (2001), 
commercial banks in Taipei,China can be further categorized as old banks, new 
                                                 
16 Prior to 1991, there were only 20 banks in operation in Taipei,China. 
17 Commercial banks dominate the financial sector, accounting for more than 80% of all loans made in 
fiscal year 2000. 
18 Taipei,Chinas medium business banks were established in 1978-1979 from mutual loan and savings 
companies with the purpose of extending medium and long-term credit to small and medium scale 
enterprises (SMEs).  Loans to SMEs must comprise at least 70% of the total loans made by these banks. 
These banks are privately owned, but they are restricted to a particular region, so competition among them 
is limited. The number of medium business banks has remained constant, but their role in the financial 
system is declining.  In fiscal year 2000, about 5.58% of total loans were made by medium business banks. 
19 These include credit cooperatives, credit departments of farmers and fishermens association and 
religious mutual savings associations (Lee (2001)).  Combined, these institutions comprise about 10% of 
total assets in the banking sector. 
(%) 
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commercial banks, industrial banks and converted banks20 (see appendix A for a detailed 
list of banks in each category).  Almost all of the old banks are government banks.  
Although the government has reduced its shareholdings in these banks and now owns less 
than a majority share in most of the old banks, government holdings are still quite large 
and the banks are largely viewed as government controlled.  The new commercial banks 
are those banks that were allowed to begin operation in the 1990s.  These new banks are 
privately owned and are in most cases affiliated with a particular family conglomerate.  
Although the old government banks continue to dominate the banking sector, accounting 
for more than 60% of total bank assets, the new commercial banks quickly established a 
sizable market share.  By 1993, just 2 years after having been established, the new 
commercial banks accounted for 22% of total banks assets (figure 25).  That share has 
grown slightly, and currently the new banks account for a quarter of total bank assets. 
 
 
Figure 25. Taipei,China: Share of Total Asset of Domestic Banks by Type 
1993-2001 
 
 
 
By most measures of performance, the new banks at first out-performed the old 
government banks.  The average return on assets of the new banks quickly out-performed 
the old banks and non-performing loan ratios were lower in the first several years for the 
new banks.  However, when conditions in the banking sector began to decline in 1997, the 
performance of the new banks suffered more.  Non-performing loan ratios for the new 
banks now exceed those of the old banks and ROA ratios have already turned negative 
(figures 26 and 27). 
 
 
                                                 
20 Many of these banks originally had very specific purposes.  For example, the Central Trust of China 
(100% government owned) is responsible for cooperating with the government in its purchasing, trade, 
banking, trust, insurance, storage, freight and other needs.  Taiwan Cooperative Bank (60% government 
owned) is designated to supervise the operations of credit cooperatives and along with the Farmers Bank of 
China (60% owned by the Ministry of Finance), specializes in agricultural financing.  In addition to these 
central government owned banks, there are two municipal government owned banksthe Bank of 
Kaohsiung and Taipeibank, as well as six provincial government controlled banksthe Bank of Taiwan, 
Chang Hwa Commercial Bank, First Commercial Bank, Hua Nan Commercial Bank, the Land Bank of 
Taiwan and the International Commercial Bank of China (Shea (1995)). 
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Figure 26. Taipei,China: Return on Assets of Domestic Banks by Type 1993-2001 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
New 0.84 0.91 0.67 0.73 0.91 0.27 0.27 -0.12 
Old 0.81 0.69 0.49 0.57 0.69 0.67 0.44 0.38 
Converted     0.97 0.66 0.35 -0.52 
Industrial 5.09 10.34 11.50 12.04 6.37 4.64 3.84 3.40 
SME 0.44 0.57 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.33 -0.21 0.03 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Taipei,China: Non-Performing Loans of Domestic Banks by Type 
1993-2001 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
New 1.96 2.27 2.74 3.63 3.74 3.98 5.15 6.68 
Old 2.26 2.58 3.75 4.94 4.82 4.80 5.15 5.17 
Converted     2.47 2.43 3.59 6.44 
Industrial 0.60 0.67 2.12 3.46 1.82 1.51 1.90 1.55 
SME     9.37 10.46 7.60 8.91 
 
 
 
As in Japan, Taipei,Chinas financial sector now suffers from the problem of 
overbanking and a lack of exit from the sector.  One problem is that when the banking 
sector was allowed to expand in Taipei,China, supervisory resources were not increased.  
Thus, both the frequency and quality of bank supervision suffered.  Hoshi and Kashyaps 
1999 prediction of a massive contraction in the size of the Japanese banking sector 
holds equally for Taipei,China. 
4. Policy Response 
4.1. Japan 
In Japan, the failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, one of the top 20 banks, 
prompted the Diet to respond to the banking sector problems that had accumulated in the 
1990s.  In February 1998 the Financial Revitalization Plan was enacted, passing two 
amendments to the deposit insurance law.  The Financial Revitalization Plan formed the 
Resolution and Collection Corporation21 (RCC) and gave it an expanded mandate to 
purchase bad loans from solvent financial institutions as well as failed banks.  The Plan 
also established the Financial Revitalization Committee to oversee bank restructuring.  
Restructuring followed one of two courses: the bridge bank scheme or nationalization.  
Under the bridge bank scheme, the troubled bank was operated by public administrators 
as a bridge bank until a successor bank could be found.  This system was used in the 
closing of several regional and regional II banks that failed in 1999.  The nationalization 
                                                 
21 The RCC merged the Housing Loan Administration Corporation (HLAC), which had been resolving the 
remaining bad debts of the jusen home mortgage lenders and the Resolution and Collection Bank (RCB), 
which had been overseeing the liquidation of assets from failed credit cooperatives.  
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scheme was used for larger failures such as the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and 
Nippon Credit Bank.  In these cases the banks were temporarily nationalized until they 
were ready to resume business as new banks (Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank, 
respectively). 
In addition to changing the legal structure, the Plan also authorized 60 trillion 
yen, the equivalent of about 12% of GDP, to revitalize the banking system.  This 60 
trillion yen was earmarked for three separate accounts within the deposit insurance 
corporation.  The largest account, receiving 25 trillion yen, was the early strengthening 
account, which was used to finance two capital injections into the banking sector.  The 
first use of the early strengthening account funds came in March 1998, when a total of 1.8 
trillion yen was injected into the banking system in the form of purchases of preferred 
stock, subordinated debt or as a subordinated loan.  Banks were reluctant to apply for the 
funds for fear of the troubled message it would send to the markets, so all 19 of the major 
banks were pressured to apply for the same amount of capital: 100 billion yen.  Some of 
the regional banks applied for smaller capital injections.   
Even with this capital injection, many of the major banks would have had 
trouble meeting the 8% capital to asset ratio required for international banks under the 
Basel Accord, so the Ministry of Finance relaxed some of the banks accounting 
standards as well.  First, banks were given the option of using fair value, the lower of 
book or market value, or book value in reporting their security holdings. This meant that 
banks did not necessarily have to report losses on securities held in their trading account 
on their balance sheets.  Secondly, banks were allowed to revalue land holdings on their 
balance sheet from cost to market value. Although land prices had dropped significantly 
from their peak, most of the land held on banks balance sheets still carried a market value 
well above that of historical cost.   
At the beginning of fiscal year 1998, the policy responses taken in Japan began 
to change. Many of the policies implemented in fiscal year 1997 could be viewed as 
largely cosmetic. Accounting standards were relaxed and capital injections given 
unconditionally to make it easier for all banks to meet the necessary capital adequacy 
requirements.  In April 1998, this trend changed with the passage of the Law to Ensure the 
Soundness of the Financial Institutions. This law was equivalent to the Prompt Corrective 
Action measures in force in the United States since the late 1980s. The law had two main 
components.  First, a self-assessment process whereby banks value assets according to 
the condition of the borrowers and the collateral securing the loan were defined. These 
self assessments were made subject to external review by auditors and bank examiners.  
Second, capital thresholds were established under which regulators could order banks to 
take remedial action ranging from a forced reduction in the number of branches to 
liquidation. 
In June 1998, another important change was implemented.  The Financial 
Supervisory Agency (FSA) was established. The FSA took over the supervision of banks, 
securities firms and insurance companies from the Ministry of Finance as well as the 
supervision of shinkin banks from the regional financial bureaus and the credit 
cooperatives from the prefectural governments.  In the autumn of 1998, the FSA 
conducted full-scale on-site examinations of the major banks and found that 
non-performing loans had been significantly understated.  In the following year, 
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examinations of the regional banks were carried out. The FSA recommended the merger 
and closure of several banks and ordered 4 others to increase their capital ratios. 
In March 1999, 14 of the major banks, as well as Yokohama Bank, received a 
second round of capital injections. This second capital injection totalled 7.5 trillion yen, 4 
times that of the first capital injection. Unlike the capital injection of 1998, the amount of 
capital varied by bank to reflect individual conditions and the banks were required to 
submit a restructuring plan, including raising new capital from the private sector, in order 
to qualify.  In addition, consolidated accounting was introduced in fiscal year 1998. Prior 
to this change, banks had been required to consolidate in their financial reporting only 
those subsidiaries or affiliates in which they held more than a 50% or 20% stake, 
respectively. Under the new law, affiliation was importantly determined by influence as 
well as share holdings.  Consolidated reporting requirements applied to non-performing 
loan estimates as well. Prior to this change in consolidated accounting requirements, 
banks had been able to set up related companies, that were neither subsidiaries nor 
affiliates, and transfer their non-performing loans to these related companies at above 
market value so as to clean up their balance sheets. 
Fiscal year 2000 was the year of consolidation in Japans banking sector.  After 
the completed formation of the Mizuho financial group,22 the Sumitomi-Mitsui Banking 
Corporation,23 and the UFJ group,24 the worlds three largest financial institutions will be 
Japanese.  In addition, Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust are forming the 
Mitsubishi-Tokyo Financial Group, which will be the worlds 5th largest financial group.  
These mergers will consolidate Japans banking sector even more than previously.  For 
example, of the original 10 city banks, only about half will remain: these four groups as 
well as Daiwa Bank and Asahi Bank.   
4.2. Taipei,China 
One notable difference in the policy responses taken in Japan and Taipei,China 
is that the government of Taipei,China has been very active in intervening in asset 
markets: both the stock market and the real estate market.  For example, government 
authorities pooled the resources of the labor retirement fund, labor health insurance fund, 
the civil retirement fund and the postal savings system to form a stock market 
stabilization fund.  For the real estate market, the central bank has several times instituted 
preferential loans to first-time home buyers in order to prop up the real estate market. The 
market has thus far not collapsed, but this policy has become less effective with each 
attempt. 
As the NPL problem became apparent, the Executive Yuan in October 2000 
introduced a 6-month loan roll-over to troubled industries (the traditional, or non-IT, 
industries).  This roll-over was later extended to all businesses and banks were apparently 
pressured by various means to comply (Yin 2001).  When the unemployment rate rose 
and individuals began to default on their mortgages, the 6-month loan roll-over was 
                                                 
22 Formed by Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank and the Industrial Bank of Japan, Mizuho will become the 
worlds largest financial institution measured in terms of assets. 
23 Formed by the merger of Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank, SMBC will become the worlds second 
largest financial institution. 
24 Formed by Sanwa Bank, Tokai Bank and Toyo Trust, UFJ will become the worlds third largest financial 
institution. 
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extended to mortgages as well.25  These early policy responses may have in fact 
exacerbated the NPL problem, but in fiscal year 2001 regulatory authorities took more 
appropriate measures to address the problem.  First, official NPL figures were 
complemented with loans under surveillance, which provided an estimate of NPLs in 
line with global standards.  This change increased the overall estimated NPL ratio from 
less than 8% to 11.5%.  In addition, the business tax on financial institutions was lowered 
from 5% to 2%, and banks were required to use the resulting tax savings to write off bad 
loans.26 
In June 2001, a series of new legislation directed at improving the condition of 
the banking sector was passed (Lee 2001).  To encourage mergers and acquisitions in the 
financial sector, the banking law was amended to raise the ceiling on individual 
ownership of a bank from 15% to 25%.  The Financial Institutions Merger Law and the 
Financial Holding Company Act were passed, allowing universal banking and promoting 
further concentration in the financial sector through tax and non-tax incentives.  The 
Financial Reconstruction Fund Setup and Management Act established the Financial 
Reconstruction Committee for a 3-year period, to be extended by one additional year if 
necessary. This authorizes the CDIC to handle failed financial institutions, funded by the 
remaining 2% business tax on the financial industry.  An amendment to the Central 
Deposit Insurance Act provides depositors with unlimited deposit insurance for the 
period of financial restructuring. 
More recently, even more aggressive measures have been introduced.  The 
reconstruction fund will be expanded from its original NT$14 billion to NT$900 billion.  
The Cabinets Financial Reform Committee has stated that all government-run 
banksthe Bank of Taiwan, Land Bank of Taiwan, Taiwan Cooperative Bank and 
Central Trust of Chinawill be transformed into private banks.  According to press 
reports, the government will push for alliances with foreign partners for these banks.  
President Chen Shui-bian recently announced a 2-5-8 Scheme: a 2-year plan to cut the 
banks non-performing loan ratio to under 5% and reach a goal of 8% capital adequacy 
ratio in line with the requirements of the Bank for International Settlements. 
5. Similarities and Differences 
The analysis above has revealed many similarities in the institutional structure of 
the banking sector, the nature of the banking sector problems and the policy responses 
taken in Japan and Taipei,China.   
First, in terms of institutional structure, the banking sector in both Japan and in 
Taipei,China is extremely concentrated.  As pointed out above, in Taipei,China, the 15 
old government banks dominate the banking sector, accounting for over 60% of loans, 
deposits and total assets of all commercial banks.  Almost half of total bank loans (44% as 
of fiscal year 2001) are made by just 6 of these old government banks: the Bank of 
Taiwan, Taiwan Cooperative Bank, the Land Bank of Taiwan, First Commercial Bank, 
Hua Nan Commercial Bank and Chang Hwa Commercial Bank.   Although there are no 
government-controlled commercial banks in Japan, the banking sector is heavily 
                                                 
25 Note that none of these loan roll overs is counted as non-performing loans. 
26 Dr. Tien-Mu Huang of the Ministry of Finance estimates that this will result in the write off of 536.7 
billion NT dollars of bad loans over three years. 
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concentrated in Japan as well.  In Japan, the banking sector is dominated by the major 
city, trust and long-term credit banks.  After the recent wave of mergers, these major 
banks number only 10.27  Although accounting for less than 10% of the total banks in 
Japan in terms of number, these major banks account for almost half of total loans (47%) 
made in Japan.   
However, in both Japan and Taipei,China, the banking sector problems began in 
the smallest financial institutions, such as the credit cooperatives.  These smaller financial 
institutions only account for a limited percentage of the market: 8.96% of total loans in 
Taipei,China and roughly 15% of total loans in Japan in fiscal year 2000.  But because of 
the strong connection between these smaller financial institutions and the large banks and 
because healthy banks were asked to take over the sick credit cooperatives as part of the 
convoy system operating in both countries, the weakness of these smaller financial 
institutions eventually spread to the larger banks in Japan and is expected to soon do so in 
Taipei,China as well.   
Looking at the nature of the banking problems in Japan and Taipei,China, it is 
clear that in both cases the problems are mostly internal.  Both Japan and Taipei,China 
have flexible exchange rates and a large stock of foreign reserves.  So although both 
countries may at the moment be vulnerable to a banking crisis, the nature of the crisis is 
very different from that which hit the rest of Asia in 1997.   
The causes of the banking sector problems in both Japan and Taipei,China can 
be identified as poor asset market performance combined with financial liberalization.  
There are strong links between the performance of asset markets and the health of the 
banking sector in both countries.  Dropping real estate prices hurt the viability of the 
banks main customers as well as eroding the value of collateral backing other types of 
loans as well.  The collapse in the stock market hurt the banks in both Japan and in 
Taipei,China directly, by reducing the market value of the short-term investment 
securities held on their balance sheets, as well as indirectly, by eroding unrealized gains 
on long-term investments which can be used toward Tier II regulatory capital.  The 
impact of equity markets on the banking sector in Taipei,China, may be even larger than 
Japan since banks in Taipei,China are also allowed to use stocks as collateral and because 
many loans go to finance leveraged stock purchases.   
In addition to facing pressure from asset markets, banks in both Japan and in 
Taipei,China were strongly affected by financial liberalization.  Deregulation of the stock 
and bond markets allowed firms in both countries to turn increasingly to direct financing 
rather than relying upon bank loans.  Thus, banks lost many of their long-standing 
customers.  In Taipei,China, additional pressure came from increased competition as the 
banking sector was opened to new entrants in the 1990s.   
Of course, some qualifications to these similarities must be made.  One 
important difference between the banking sector in Taipei,China and in Japan is the 
corporate governance structure.  In Taipei,China, corporate governance can be 
characterized as family-based business groups.  A 1998 study by Ko and Yeh shows that 
for 1994-1995, family groups controlled 78% of listed companies on the TAIEX.  This 
study shows that in most cases (57%), the largest family holds more than half the board 
                                                 
27 Asahi Bank, Daiwa Bank, Shinsei Bank, Nippon Trust, Yasuda Trust, the Mitsubishi-Tokyo Financial 
Group, the Mizuho Financial Group, the Sumitomo-Mitsui Banking Corporation, the UFJ Financial Group 
and the Chuo-Mitsui Trust and Banking Corporation. 
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seats and on average, the largest family controls 27% of the outstanding shares.  In 
addition to their personal shares, large shareholders may use holding companies, nominee 
accounts and cross-shareholding of affiliated companies to increase their control.  This 
concentration of shareholding blurs the separation between ownership and management 
and decision making is often made by the controlling family.  Unlike in Japan, the 
banking sector in Taipei,China plays a minor role in corporate governance.28 
This is mainly due to a 5% regulatory limit on the amount of shares that banks 
and insurance companies may invest in any one public company and also on the total 
amount that banks and insurance companies may invest in publicly-listed companies.29  
This is quite different from the traditional main bank system in Japan, under which the 
major banks play an important role in corporate governance.30 
Another difference in the institutional characteristics of the banking sector as 
between Taipei,China and Japan is the extent of government involvement.  As pointed out 
above, in Taipei,China, the 15 old government banks dominate the banking sector, 
accounting for over 60% of loans, deposits and total assets of all commercial banks.  In 
Japan, there are no government-owned commercial banks.   
The sectoral structure of bank lending is also different in Japan and 
Taipei,China.  Over 40% of the loan portfolio of banks in Taipei,China is made up of 
loans to individuals, primarily residential real estate loans.  An even larger percentage, 
45%, of the non-performing loans held by banks in Taipei,China are loans to individuals.  
This is very different from the sectoral composition of bank lending in Japan, where loans 
to individuals only comprise about 17% of total loans.  Although banks in Japan also have 
a heavy exposure to real estate lending, most of these loans are commercial property 
deals.   
In terms of policy response, there are even more differences in evidence.  The 
government has intervened in the market much more in Taipei,China than in Japan.  This 
intervention has come in the form of loan relief programs and price keeping operations 
in the real estate and stock markets.  The government-owned pension fund and postal 
savings system have been used in these efforts.   
Taipei,China has still not experienced a major bank failure.  Perhaps because of 
this, some of the policies used in dealing with Japans banking crisis in 1997 have not yet 
been implemented in Taipei,China.  One important policy taken in Japan was the 1997 
and 1998 capital injections into the banking sector.  Although this has been discussed in 
Taipei,China, it has not yet been implemented, perhaps because policy makers do not 
believe the banking sector problems have come to that point.  In addition, Taipei,China 
has not yet instituted a central regulatory authority such as the Financial Supervisory 
Agency (FSA), which was established in June of 1998.  Again, this is apparently under 
discussion in Taipei,China, but did not pass in the June 2001 legislative package.   
Several recently-passed measures such as legislation to encourage the 
establishment of asset management companies, mergers and consolidation among banks, 
and reductions in non-performing loan ratios look promising, but how these plans are 
                                                 
28 According to data reported by Ko and Yeh (October 1998), domestic banks in Taipei,China only held 
4.91% of listed shares in 1998. 
29 Originally, this limit was set at 15% of a banks net worth, but in response to the poor performance of the 
equity market in recent years the government has raised the limit to 20% and most recently 25%. 
30 Although regulations also limit the amount of shares a bank in Japan may hold in any one company to 5%, 
there is no limit on the total number of shares to be held by financial institutions. 
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actually implemented and how actively the banks choose to make use of these options 
remains to be seen.   
6. Lessons from the Japanese Experience 
Although the banking sector problems being faced in Taipei,China are of course 
not identical to those in Japan, the similarities are striking and there is much to be learned 
from Japans experience.   
First, a review of the chronology of Japans banking crisis reveals that early 
warning signs of a banking crisis in Japan came in the form of failures of small regional 
banks and credit cooperatives.  However, because these problems were manageable under 
the deposit insurance system, they did not generate public concern. Even in 1995 when 
the jusen failures brought the banking sector problems into the public eye, the fact that the 
largest banks were only indirectly involved prevented recognition of serious systemic 
risk.   
Public opposition to the jusen resolution scheme backfired later by making it 
politically difficult for policy makers to appropriate public funds in order to address the 
banking crisis after it erupted on a grand scale in 1997.  In Taipei,China, this problem 
may have been avoided by funding the financial reconstruction fund with a business tax 
on banks.  However, as mentioned above, this approach continues the practice of forcing 
healthy banks to absorb (indirectly in this case) the losses of unhealthy financial 
institutions, which can be damaging to the banking sector in the long run.   
Public opposition to the injection of any public funds into the banking sector was 
certainly a contributing factor to the length of the banking crisis in Japan.  However, the 
most significant reason for the regulatory forbearance that many economists blame for 
prolonging Japans banking sector distress31, was that authorities and bank managers 
hoped that a macroeconomic recovery would lift and save the banking sector.  This hope 
has proven to be unfounded and policy makers in Taipei,China should adjust their 
expectations by observing Japans experience in this regard.  During Japans brief 
economic recovery in fiscal year 1995-1996, when GDP, investment and consumption 
grew and the stock market recovered slightly, land prices continued to fall and the banks 
saw no reduction in the amount of non-performing loans on their books (see figure 28). 
Thus, hopes that the banking sector could grow out of the problem were dashed. 
 
 
Figure 28. Japan: Growth Rates of Key Economic Variables 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Kanaya and Woo (2000). 
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When Japans Ministry of Finance abandoned the Too Big to Close doctrine in 
November 1997, the need for a transfer of public funds into the banking sector was 
evident. However, as discussed above, public sentiment after the jusen bailout in 1995 
had made any discussion of the injection of public funds into the banking sector 
politically taboo, delaying any response by the government.  The government finally did 
manage to take action at the close of fiscal year 1997, but the amount of the initial capital 
injection was too small to fully resolve the problem. Additionally, capital was given 
unconditionally and uniformly to all banks. To compensate for insufficient capital 
injection, authorities turned instead to relaxing accounting standards so that the banks 
would be able to meet the required 8% capital adequacy standard.  This is another 
negative lesson for authorities in Taipei,China.   
However, the experience of Japan can set some good examples as well.  By 
fiscal year 1999, the regulatory environment in Japan had changed significantly. 
Line-by-line consolidated reporting was introduced, non-performing loan definitions 
were expanded and reporting requirements tightened. Additionally, prompt corrective 
action, which imposed penalties on under-capitalized banks, was introduced. A second 
capital injection, four times larger than the first, was made. This round of capital was 
properly allocated based on the varying conditions of individual banks and in order to 
qualify banks had to submit a restructuring plan. As a result, loan write-offs increased 
dramatically at the close of fiscal year 1999.  Equally important, a centralized regulatory 
authority, the Financial Supervisory Agency, was established to implement these 
regulatory changes and to take over supervision of all financial institutions.   
Given the similarities in Taipei,China, there is much to be learned from a careful 
analysis of Japans banking crisis.  The most relevant lessons to be learned from Japans 
mixed experience are summed up below.  First, the failure of small regional banks and 
credit cooperatives in Taipei,China should serve as a warning sign of a brewing systemic 
crisis.  Second, authorities in Taipei,China should quickly implement consolidated, 
mark-to-market accounting so that the true magnitude of the problem is made public.  
Third, a centralized regulatory authority needs to be established to implement these new 
regulations and to consolidate supervision of the financial industry.  Perhaps most 
importantly, policy makers in Taipei,China should learn from Japans negative 
experience with regulatory forbearance and not delay in the hope of a macroeconomic 
recovery to grow banks out of their problems.   
Failure to deal quickly and decisively with problems in the banking sector leads 
banks to become more risk averse, shifting their portfolios away from loans and into safer 
assets such as government bonds, which means that even viable firms do not have access 
to bank credit.  The resulting credit crunch exacerbates macroeconomic problems.  In 
Japan, expectation that banking sector could grow out of its problems proved to be 
unfounded and has only prolonged resolution of the problems.  Policy makers in 
Taipei,China should be well advised not to follow this example. 
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Appendix 
 
A. List of Financial Institutions in Taipei,China32 
1. Old Banks (15) 
Bank of Taiwan33 (Provincial Government) 
Export-Import Bank (Government) 
Farmers Bank of Taiwan (Government) 
Hua Nan Commercial Bank Ltd. (Provincial Government) 
International Commercial Bank of China (Provincial Government) 
Land Bank of Taiwan (Provincial Government) 
Taiwan Co-operative Bank34 (Government) 
Bank of Kaosiung (Municipal Government) 
Central Trust of China (Government) 
Chang Hwa Commercial Bank Ltd. (Provincial Government) 
Overseas Chinese Bank (Overseas Chinese and Government) 
Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank Ltd. (Rong Family) 
Taipei Bank (Municipal Government) 
First Commercial Bank35 (Provincial Government) 
United World Chinese Commercial Bank (Various Government Banks) 
2. New Commercial Banks (21) 
Asia Pacific Bank (Diversified) 
Bank Sinopac (RUNTEX Group36) 
Bao-Dao Commercial Bank (Jih Sun Group37) 
Chinfon Commercial Bank (Sanyang Group38) 
Chinatrust Commercial Bank (Chinatrust Group39) 
Grand Commercial Bank (Presidents Group40) 
Pan Asia Bank (KMT and Nice Industry) 
Taishin International Bank (Shin Kong Group41) 
Union Bank of Taiwan (Unions Group - Sanchung Group42) 
The Chinese Bank (Rebars Group43) 
                                                 
32 Classifications as well as notes on ownership from Lee (2001). 
33 Proposed merger between Bank of Taiwan, Land Bank of Taiwan and Central Trust of China. 
34 Proposed merger between Taiwan Co-operative Bank and Chinfon Bank. 
35 Proposed merger between First Commercial Bank, Pan Asia and Dah-An Bank. 
36 Yin Family.  Closely related to KMT. 
37 Chen Family. 
38 Huang Family. 
39 Koo Family. 
40 Kao and Ho Families. 
41 Wu Family. 
42 Lin Family. 
43 Wang Family. 
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Chung Shing Bank (Hua Eng Group44) 
Cosmos Bank (Prince Group45) 
Da Chong Bank (Sanyang, Industry, Formosa Plastic, Chan Family) 
Dah An Commercial Bank (Walsin Lihwa Corporation, Yi-Mei Food46) 
E. Sun Commercial Bank (Cathays Insurance47) 
En Tie Commercial Bank (En-Tie Group, Sanchung Group48) 
Far Eastern International Bank (Far Eastern Group49) 
Fubon Commercial Bank (Tsai Family) 
Hsinchu International Bank (Wu Family) 
International Bank of Taipei (Loc Family, Shin Kong Group, YFY Group, Lien Family50) 
Taichung Business Bank (Everfortune Group, Tsai Family51) 
3. Industrial Banks (3) 
Chiao Tung Bank (Government) 
China Development Industrial Bank52 (KMT influential) 
Industrial Bank of Taiwan53 (Loc Family and various hi-tech firms) 
4. Converted Banks 
Cathay United Bank54 (Cathay Group, Tsai Family) 
Bank of Panshin55 (Diversified) 
COTA Commercial Bank56 (Diversified) 
Hwatai Bank57 (Diversified) 
Kao Shin Commercial Bank58 (Diversified) 
Lucky Bank59 (Diversified) 
Makoto Bank60 (Diversified, Chairman Lin) 
Sunny Bank61 (Diversified, Chairman Chen) 
United Credit Commercial Bank62 (Diversified) 
 
 
                                                 
44 Wang Family.  Under government supervision. 
45 Hsu Family. 
46 Jiaw and Kao Families. 
47 President Huang. 
48 Lin Group. 
49 Hsu Family.   DBS interested in take-over. 
50 Lien Family is influential. 
51 Tsai Family is influential. 
52 From China Development Corporation. 
53 Newly established. 
54 Converted from Taiwan First Investment and Trust Companies. 
55 From Panchiao Credit Cooperative. 
56 56 5 From Taichung Third Credit Cooperative. 
57 From Taipei Second Credit Cooperative. 
58 From Kaosiung First Credit Cooperative. 
59 From Taichung Seventh Credit Cooperative. 
60 From Taipei Third Credit Cooperative. 
61 From Yang Ming Shan Credit Cooperative. 
62 Formed July 1, 2000 by Taichung Sixth Credit Cooperative and Pingdong First Credit Cooperative. 
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5. SME Banks (5) 
Taiwan Businesss Bank (Government) 
Tainan Business Bank (Chen Family) 
Kaohsiung Business Bank (KMT) 
Enterprise Bank of Hualien (Sino-Japan International Group63) 
Taitung Business Bank (Full Long Group64) 
 
 
                                                 
63 Lin Family. 
64 Yew Family. 
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B. List of Financial Institutions in Japan: The Original Top 20 Banks 
1. City Banks (10) 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi65 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (DKB)66 
Fuji Bank 
Sakura Bank67 
Sanwa Bank68 
Sumitomo Bank 
Asahi Bank 
Tokai Bank 
Daiwa Bank 
Hokkaido Bank Takushoku Bank (now bankrupt) 
2. Trust Banks (7) 
Yasuda Trust & Banking Co. 
Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Corporation 
Mitsui Trust & Banking Company69 
Toyo Trust and Banking Co. 
Chuo Trust & Banking Co. 
Nippon Trust Bank 
3. Long-Term Credit Banks (3) 
Industrial Bank of Japan 
Nippon Credit Bank (now Aozora Bank) 
The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan (now Shinsei Bank) 
 
                                                 
65 In fiscal year 2001 Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Company formed the 
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group. 
66 In fiscal year 2001 Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank and the Industrial Bank of Japan formed the Mizuho 
Financial Group. 
67 In fiscal year 2001 Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank formed the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation 
(SMBC). 
68 In fiscal year 2001 Sanwa Bank, Tokai Bank and Toyo Trust and Banking Corporation formed the UFJ  
(United Financial Japan) Financial Group. 
69 Mitsui Trust and Banking Company and Chuo Trust and Banking Company merged to form the 
Chuo-Mitsui Trust and Banking Corporation. 
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